Q&A: Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution

April 21, 2003 -- After two decades as the main Shiite group opposing Saddam Hussein's regime, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is expected to be a key player in the shaping of a new, post-Saddam political system. Following are some questions and answers about the group.

What is SCIRI?

The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq was founded in 1982 by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a Shiite cleric who had fled to neighboring Iran after being persecuted and jailed by Saddam's regime. The group was based in Iran until Saddam's overthrow in 2003, and received support from Iran's Islamist government.

Its military wing, the Badr Brigades, is believed to have 8,000-10,000 fighters, many of them recruited from Iraqi Shiite prisoners captured by Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.

How much support does SCIRI have among Shiites living in Iraq?

Although it is difficult to measure the political weight of SCIRI, it is safe to say that the group has a critical social base that makes it a power to be reckoned with in determining Iraq's future. It is one of the most organized political-religious movements within the Shiite community. It has widespread appeal among the large number of Shiites who have gravitated toward a more radicalized form of Islam as a result of the oppressive socio-economic and political conditions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

What is SCIRI's attitude toward the United States?

The group's rank-and-file followers tend to be deeply suspicious of the United States. Religiously oriented Shiites felt betrayed by the first Bush administration when it failed to support their revolt against Saddam's regime in 1991. Their views also parallel those of their religious cohorts in Iran.

How does SCIRI compare with other opposition groups in Iraq?

In terms of political weight and social base, SCIRI is far more embedded inside Iraq than the U.S.-backed Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC has a long way to go before growing deep roots in the country. Its close dependence on and alliance with the current Bush administration is more of a handicap than an advantage in trying to consolidate a nationalist posture. On balance, it is perceived to be a pawn in Washington's geostrategic game.

What is SCIRI's political stance? How religious is it? How credible is its democratic rhetoric?

SCIRI's rhetoric is very religious. Its leaders say they are committed to a democratic project based on a vote for every man and woman. Its detractors fear that this commitment would usher in an Islamist Iraq because the Shiite community represents more than 60 percent of the population. It is difficult to say what positions SCIRI represents because the group has not developed a comprehensive program that sheds light on its ideological premises. Its ultimate aim is to create an Islamic state and society in Iraq.

What are the likely prospects are for SCIRI's influence in the future?

Despite SCIRI's boycott of a U.S.-backed organizational meeting held April 15 and its statements about resisting any U.S. occupation, the group will likely play a critical role in influencing the course of events in the new Iraq. Given its broad social base of support, it can neither be ignored nor dismissed. Its integration into the Iraqi body politic will serve as a stabilizing mechanism.

The danger lies in the potential for civil strife. If Iraq fractures and descends into chaos, SCIRI would likely emerge as a dominant political force in the country. It has the potential to be transformed into the Hizballah of Iraq.

What would it mean for Iraq if SCIRI played a prominent role in its future governance?

If SCIRI is integrated peacefully into Iraqi politics, it will likely play by the rules of the political game and serve as a stabilizing force. Its inclusion, not its exclusion, disarms and pre-empts the religious hard-liners within its rank.

Fawaz Gerges is a professor of International Affairs and Middle Eastern studies at Sarah Lawrence College.