FBI, CIA Cooperation a Tough Task

W A S H I N G T O N, July 25, 2002 -- They are the squabbling siblings of the federal intelligence family — the FBI and CIA — but the government wants any feud to end.

When President Bush this week made a pitch for a permanent Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, he offered a gentle rap on the knuckles of the two agencies most responsible for counter-terrorism.

"Prior to Sept. 11, we had the CIA collecting information and we had the FBI collecting information and sometimes they weren't talking all that much. Now they talk. Now they coordinate," Bush said during a visit Monday to a high-tech lab in Chicago.

It doesn't seem like such a radical idea: the nation's leading law enforcement and biggest intelligence agency talking to each other to assess threats and compare leads. But in the tradition-bound — some say hidebound — worlds of the two separate bureaucracies, information sharing has always been a problem.

"There's a number of people out there that have made a pretty good case that if various data points had been connected that, potentially, 9/11 could have been prevented," said Phil Anderson, director of the homeland security initiative for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Anderson said the key point is that the government did not have and still does not have a real process to connect these data points.

"There are enormous obstacles, cultural obstacles — probably first and foremost, cultural obstacles — in addition, there are technological obstacles which can be overcome in time with the right investment and technology. The cultural obstacle is going to be a little more difficult to address," Anderson said.

Laws, Missions and Culture

Some of these so-called cultural obstacles are rooted in law and the differing missions handed to each agency. But some are bureaucratic inclinations that developed over time. And these inclinations are almost mirror images of each other, says Ron Kessler, who has written books on both the FBI and the CIA. (Read an excerpt of Kessler's book The Bureau)

For example, the FBI excels at shoe-leather investigations but lacks a structure to make sense of what its agents found. Part of this was because of technological backwardness, which Kessler blames on a lack of interest by former FBI Director Louis Freeh, who led the agency through most of the 1990s.

"The fact is the FBI literally had 386 and 486 computers that nobody would take even as a donation to a church," Kessler said. "When they had to send a photo of a suspect to another office, they would actually send it to their home computer or to a police station because they couldn't download it at the FBI."The CIA is almost the opposite, says Anderson, with strong technical and analytical abilities but a need for more and better sources. "What the CIA needs to do is to develop human intelligence gathering capabilities," he said.

"It's one thing to have a satellite in the sky that can take a picture down to one meter of resolution ... [but] it doesn't help you to know that there's three guys on the ground, each carrying a rifle. You've got to know what they're talking about," Anderson said.

Of course, some practices for which the agencies are criticized now are rooted in practices that seemed logical in the past, like the FBI's penchant for secrecy — an instinct honed in part out of the need to preserve evidence for use in court.

And some are response to past criticism, such as restrictions on the CIA's use of intelligence sources with unsavory backgrounds. That change came after a series of public relations disasters, like the discovery that Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega had been on the CIA payroll.

The CIA had a restriction against using, as agents, people who had engaged in human rights abuses unless special permission was obtained, Kessler said.

"That's crazy. That's like the FBI not wanting to use Sammy Gravano to go after the Mafia because Sammy Gravano had killed 20 people. Well, the people you need to give you information about these threats are those bad guys and if you don't use them, you are not going to get anything," Kessler said.

Effects of Sept. 11

Inevitably, though, Sept. 11 has provoked new scrutiny of both the FBI and CIA and remarkable public admissions from the leaders of each. At a Senate hearing last month attended by both directors, FBI Director Robert Mueller was still dogged by the embarrassing disclosures that suspicious activity at flight schools had been flagged by agents before the attacks but ignored at headquarters.

"To be blunt, pre 9/11 our analyst numbers were woefully inadequate. The effect not only was inadequate operational support but also an inability to finish and timely disseminate intelligence," Mueller told lawmakers.

CIA Director George Tenet said an important historic lesson had been learned. "We can no longer race from threat to threat to threat, resolve it, disrupt it, and then move on," he said.

For all the talk of new technology and new organizations, some obvious challenges remain for both agencies. Neither has enough employees who speak Arabic and other languages. And even with 900 new agents expected to be hired this fall, the FBI remains less than a third the size of the New York City Police Department.

Kessler, among others believes that given the demands being placed on the FBI, even more resources should be devoted to it. Still, he credits the leaders of both agencies with responding aggressively to the nation's post Sept. 11 needs.

"So when people are saying the FBI or the CIA are behind or not up to the job, it is really old news," Kessler said. "It is something that was true in the past and now really, both agencies are well focused and aggressive and quite different from the way they used to be."