Full Text of Powell's Address to U.N.

Feb. 5, 2003 -- Secretary of State Colin Powell presented satellite photos and audiotapes of Iraqi officers' conversations as proof to the U.N. Security Council that Saddam Hussein has failed to disarm. Below is the complete text of Powell's speech.

POWELL: Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished colleagues, Iwould like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effortthat each of you made to be here today.

This is important day for us all as we review the situation withrespect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under U.N. SecurityCouncil Resolution 1441.

Last Nov. 8, this council passed Resolution 1441 by aunanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq ofits weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guiltyof material breach of its obligations, stretching back over 16previous resolutions and 12 years.

Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party,but a regime this council has repeatedly convicted over the years.Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to comeinto compliance or to face serious consequences. No council memberpresent in voting on that day had any allusions about the nature andintent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraqdid not comply.

And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperatewith returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA.

We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow theinspectors to do their job.

This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply anddisarm and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone outof its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; theyare not detectives.

I asked for this session today for two purposes: First, tosupport the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. AsDr. Blix reported to this council on Jan. 27, quote, "Iraqappears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, ofthe disarmament which was demanded of it," unquote.

And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of Dec. 7,quote, "did not provide any new information relevant to certainquestions that have been outstanding since 1998."

My second purpose today is to provide you withadditional information, to share with you what the United States knowsabout Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq's involvementin terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and otherearlier resolutions.

I might add at this point that we are providing all relevantinformation we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.

The material I will present to you comes from a variety ofsources. Some are U.S. sources. And some are those of othercountries. Some of the sources are technical, such as interceptedtelephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sourcesare people who have risked their lives to let the world know whatSaddam Hussein is really up to.

I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can sharewith you, when combined with what all of us have learned over theyears, is deeply troubling.

What you will see is an accumulation of facts anddisturbing patterns of behavior. The facts on Iraqis' behavior — Iraq's behavior demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime havemade no effort — no effort — to disarm as required by theinternational community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior showthat Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts toproduce more weapons of mass destruction.

Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about tohear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes placeon Nov. 26 of last year, on the day before United Nations teamsresumed inspections in Iraq.

The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and abrigadier general, from Iraq's elite military unit, the RepublicanGuard.

(BEGIN AUDIOTAPE)

Let me pause and review some of the key elements of thisconversation that you just heard between these two officers.

First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohamed ElBaradei, iscoming, and they know what he's coming for, and they know he's comingthe next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. Heis expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hidethings.

But they're worried. "We have this modified vehicle. What do wesay if one of them sees it?"

What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something theyshould not have, something that should not be seen.

The general is incredulous: "You didn't get a modified. Youdon't have one of those, do you?"

"I have one."

"Which, from where?"

"From the workshop, from the Al Kendi (ph) Company?"

"What?"

"From Al Kendi (ph)."

"I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried. You all havesomething left."

"We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left."

Note what he says: "We evacuated everything."

We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. Wedidn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure itwas not around when the inspectors showed up.

"I will come to you tomorrow."

The Al Kendi (ph) Company: This is a company that is well knownto have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.

Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall,the inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on Jan. 16. OnJan. 20, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it wouldsearch for more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guardheadquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Theirconversation took place just last week on Jan. 30.

(BEGIN AUDIOTAPE)

Let me pause again and review the elements of thismessage.

"They're inspecting the ammunition you have, yes."

"Yes."

"For the possibility there are forbidden ammo."

"For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?"

"Yes."

"And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of theareas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there isnothing there."

Remember the first message, evacuated.

This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving thingsout of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind.

If you go a little further into this message, and you see thespecific instructions from headquarters: "After you have carried outwhat is contained in this message, destroy the message because I don'twant anyone to see this message."

"OK, OK."

Why? Why?

This message would have verified to the inspectors that they havebeen trying to turn over things. They were looking for things. Butthey don't want that message seen, because they were trying to cleanup the area to leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons ofmass destruction. And they can claim that nothing was there. And theinspectors can look all they want, and they will find nothing.

This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or twoisolated events, quite the contrary. This is part and parcel of apolicy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy setat the highest levels of the Iraqi regime.

We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called quote, "a highercommittee for monitoring the inspections teams," unquote. Think aboutthat. Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors whowere sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament.

Not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but tospy on them and keep them from doing their jobs.

The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headedby Iraq's vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan. Its members includeSaddam Hussein's son Qusay.

This committee also includes Lt. Gen. Amir al-Saadi, anadviser to Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately familiar toyou, Gen. Saadi has been the Iraqi regime's primary point ofcontact for Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It was Gen. Saadi who lastfall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperateunconditionally with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Saadi's job isnot to cooperate, it is to deceive; not to disarm, but to underminethe inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to makesure they learn nothing.

We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee.We learned that just prior to the return of inspectors last Novemberthe regime had decided to resume what we heard called, quote, "the oldgame of cat and mouse," unquote.

For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraqsubmitted to this council on Dec. 7. Iraq never had any intentionof complying with this council's mandate.

Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration, overwhelmus and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information aboutIraq's permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursueIraq's prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us, in this room,to give those us on this council the false impression that theinspection process was working.

You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-pagedeclaration, rich in volume, but poor in information and practicallydevoid of new evidence.

Could any member of this council honestly rise in defense of thisfalse declaration?

Everything we have seen and heard indicates that, instead ofcooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success oftheir mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all theypossibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutelynothing.

My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up bysources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're givingyou are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I willcite some examples, and these are from human sources.

Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as well asto Saddam Hussein's own office, to hide all correspondence with theOrganization of Military Industrialization.

This is the organization that oversees Iraq's weapons ofmass destruction activities. Make sure there are no documents leftwhich could connect you to the OMI.

We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of allprohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We knowthat Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party andscientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other keyfiles from military and scientific establishments have been placed incars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqiintelligence agents to avoid detection.

Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectorsrecently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When theysearched the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncoveredroughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here being brought outof the home and placed in U.N. hands. Some of the material isclassified and related to Iraq's nuclear program.

Tell me, answer me, are the inspectors to search the house ofevery government official, every Baath Party member and everyscientist in the country to find the truth, to get the informationthey need, to satisfy the demands of our council?

Our sources tell us that, in some cases, the hard drives ofcomputers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took thehard drives. Where did they go? What's being hidden? Why? There'sonly one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from theinspectors.

Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving, notjust documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction tokeep them from being found by inspectors.

While we were here in this council chamber debatingResolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that amissile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers andwarheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations,distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of thelaunchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm treesand were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection.

We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materialshave recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of massdestruction facilities.

Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple.The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for theaverage person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work ofphoto analysis takes experts with years and years of experience,pouring for hours and hours over light tables. But as I show youthese images, I will try to capture and explain what they mean, whatthey indicate to our imagery specialists.

Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munitionfacility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji(ph). This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know thatthis one has housed chemical munitions. In fact, this is where theIraqis recently came up with the additional four chemical weaponshells.

Here, you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines.The four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitionsbunkers.

How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you acloser look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate thepresence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemicalmunitions. The arrow at the top that says security points to afacility that is the signature item for this kind of bunker. Insidethat facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor anyleakage that might come out of the bunker.

The truck you also see is a signature item. It's adecontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.

This is characteristic of those four bunkers. The specialsecurity facility and the decontamination vehicle will be in the area,if not at any one of them or one of the other, it is moving aroundthose four, and it moves as it needed to move, as people are workingin the different bunkers.

Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at twoof those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, thetents are gone, it's been cleaned up, and it was done on the 22nd ofDecember, as the U.N. inspection team is arriving, and you can see theinspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture onthe right.

The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They foundnothing.

This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraqhad been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji (ph). Asit did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively usingits considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicitactivities. From our sources, we know that inspectors are underconstant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives.Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications,both voice and electronics.

I would call my colleagues attention to the fine paperthat United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes inexquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.

In this next example, you will see the type of concealmentactivity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption ofinspections. Indeed, in November 2002, just when the inspections wereabout to resume this type of activity spiked. Here are threeexamples.

At this ballistic missile site, on Nov. 10, we saw a cargotruck preparing to move ballistic missile components. At thisbiological weapons related facility, on Nov. 25, just two daysbefore inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared, something wealmost never see at this facility, and we monitor it carefully andregularly.

At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days beforeinspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared along with thetruck-mounted crane to move missiles. We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites.

Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment thatI've just highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns ofnormalcy. We don't know precisely what Iraq was moving, but theinspectors already knew about these sites, so Iraq knew that theywould be coming.

We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment ofthis nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstratewhat they had or did not have?

Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about theneed to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraqtake all of this equipment? Why wasn't it presented to theinspectors?

Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flightsthat would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being movedbefore, during and after inspectors.

This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is indirect, specific violation of operative paragraph seven of ourResolution 1441.

Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to concealweapons, they're also trying to hide people. You know the basicfacts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate,unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and otherpersons as required by Resolution 1441.

The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presenceof an Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi organizationcharged with facilitating inspections announced, announced publiclyand announced ominously that, quote, "Nobody is ready to leave Iraq tobe interviewed."

Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conductingespionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with U.N.inspectors was committing treason.

Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide acomprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of massdestruction programs. Iraq's list was out of date and contained onlyabout 500 names, despite the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put togethera list of about 3,500 names.

Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us.

Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to preventinterviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqiscientists warned of the serious consequences that they and theirfamilies would face if they revealed any sensitive information to theinspectors. They were forced to sign documents acknowledging thatdivulging information is punishable by death.

Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not toagree to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraqwould be treated as a spy. This violates 1441.

In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqiexperts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the specialsecurity organization to receive counterintelligence training. Thetraining focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistancetechniques, and how to mislead inspectors.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts,corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligenceservices of other countries.

For example, in mid-December weapons experts at one facility werereplaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectorsabout the work that was being done there.

On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued afalse death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent intohiding.

In the middle of January, experts at one facility that wasrelated to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been orderedto stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from otherIraqi military facilities not engaged in elicit weapons projects wereto replace the workers who'd been sent home. A dozen experts havebeen placed under house arrest, not in their own houses, but as agroup at one of Saddam Hussein's guest houses. It goes on and on andon.

As the examples I have just presented show, the information andintelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic efforton the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people fromthe inspectors in direct violation of Resolution 1441. The pattern isnot just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely a lack ofcooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent anymeaningful inspection work.

My colleagues, operative paragraph four of U.N. Resolution 1441,which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that falsestatements and omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq atany time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation ofthis resolution shall constitute — the facts speak for themselves — shall constitute a further material breach of its obligation.

We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test — togive Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest declaration andwould they early on indicate a willingness to cooperate with theinspectors? It was designed to be an early test.

They failed that test. By this standard, the standard of thisoperative paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further materialbreach of its obligations. I believe this conclusion is irrefutableand undeniable.

Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequencescalled for in U.N. Resolution 1441. And this body places itself indanger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its willwithout responding effectively and immediately.

The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to givethe inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how muchlonger are we willing to put up with Iraq's noncompliance before we,as a council, we, as the United Nations, say: "Enough. Enough."

The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of thethreat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world.Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why theyare real and present dangers to the region and to the world.

First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here aboutbiological weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think thereare just three quick points I need to make.

First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long andfrustrating years to pry — to pry — an admission out of Iraq that ithad biological weapons.

Second, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995,the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, alittle bit about this amount — this is just about the amount of ateaspoon — less than a teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelopeshutdown the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This forcedseveral hundred people to undergo emergency medical treatment andkilled two postal workers just from an amount just about this quantitythat was inside of an envelope.

Iraq declared 8,500 liters of anthrax, but UNSCOMestimates that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. Ifconcentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough to filltens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons. And SaddamHussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full ofthis deadly material.

And that is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis havenever accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted theyhad and we know they had. They have never accounted for all theorganic material used to make them. And they have not accounted formany of the weapons filled with these agents such as there are 400bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is allwell-documented.

Dr. Blix told this council that Iraq has provided little evidenceto verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of itsdestruction. It should come as no shock then, that since SaddamHussein forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed muchintelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons.

One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thickintelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is theexistence of mobile production facilities used to make biologicalagents.

Let me take you inside that intelligence file and sharewith you what we know from eye witness accounts. We have firsthanddescriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails.

The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed toevade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they canproduce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amountthat Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.

Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the mid-1990s,U.N. inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs.Confirmation came later, in the year 2000.

The source was an eye witness, an Iraqi chemical engineer whosupervised one of these facilities. He actually was present duringbiological agent production runs. He was also at the site when anaccident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure tobiological agents.

He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, thebiological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays atmidnight because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the MuslimHoly Day, Thursday night through Friday. He added that this wasimportant because the units could not be broken down in the middle ofa production run, which had to be completed by Friday evening beforethe inspectors might arrive again.

This defector is currently hiding in another country with thecertain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him.His eyewitness account of these mobile production facilities has beencorroborated by other sources.

A second source, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to knowthe details of the program, confirmed the existence of transportablefacilities moving on trailers.

A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted onroad trailer units and on rail cars.

Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi major, who defected, confirmedthat Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories, in addition tothe production facilities I mentioned earlier.

We have diagrammed what our sources reported about thesemobile facilities. Here you see both truck and rail car-mountedmobile factories. The description our sources gave us of thetechnical features required by such facilities are highly detailed andextremely accurate. As these drawings based on their descriptionshow, we know what the fermenters look like, we know what the tanks,pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We know how they fittogether. We know how they work. And we know a great deal about theplatforms on which they are mounted.

As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealedeasily, either by moving ordinary-looking trucks and rail cars alongIraq's thousands of miles of highway or track, or by parking them in agarage or warehouse or somewhere in Iraq's extensive system ofunderground tunnels and bunkers.

We know that Iraq has at lest seven of these mobile biologicalagent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or threetrucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities arevery few, perhaps 18 trucks that we know of — there may be more — but perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucksamong the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads ofIraq every single day.

It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq wasmaking biological agents. How long do you think it will take theinspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq comingforward, as they are supposed to, with the information about thesekinds of capabilities?

Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticatedfacilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinumtoxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in asingle month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. And dryagent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings.

By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected dryingtechniques for their biological weapons programs. Now, Iraq hasincorporated this drying expertise into these mobile productionfacilities.

We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfullyweaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents,including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Husseinhas investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such asgas gangrene, plague, typhus (ph), tetanus, cholera, camelpox andhemorrhagic fever, and he also has the wherewithal to developsmallpox.

The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disburse lethalbiological agents, widely and discriminately into the water supply,into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fueltanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained byUNSCOM some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Notethe spray coming from beneath the Mirage; that is 2,000 liters ofsimulated anthrax that a jet is spraying.

In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Sali Abdul Latif(ph), told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mountedonto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle,or a UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal methodfor launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons.

Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks. But tothis day, it has provided no credible evidence that they weredestroyed, evidence that was required by the international community.

There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weaponsand the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has theability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that cancause massive death and destruction. If biological weapons seem tooterrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling.

UNMOVIC already laid out much of this, and it is documented forall of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on the subject.

Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need tokeep in mind: First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weaponson another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history ofchemical warfare, no country has had more battlefield experience withchemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has neveraccounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shellswith mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increasehis stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents. If weconsider just one category of missing weaponry — 6,500 bombs from theIran-Iraq war — UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in themwould be in the order of 1,000 tons. These quantities of chemicalweapons are now unaccounted for.

Dr. Blix has quipped that, quote, "Mustard gas is not (inaudible)You are supposed to know what you did with it."

We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with it, and he hasnot come clean with the international community. We have evidencethese weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq thatthey have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are stillwaiting for.

Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete withlies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had producedfour tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. A single drop of VX on theskin will kill in minutes. Four tons.

The admission only came out after inspectors collecteddocumentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamal, SaddamHussein's late son-in-law. UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence thatIraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery.

Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX.And on Jan. 27, UNMOVIC told this council that it has informationthat conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program.

We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicitchemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilianindustry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, theinfrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit andlegitimate production can go on simultaneously; or, on a dime, thisdual-use infrastructure can turn from clandestine to commercial andthen back again.

These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections of suchfacilities would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited,especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming.Call it ingenuous or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designedtheir chemical weapons programs to be inspected. It is infrastructurewith a built-in ally.

Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertakenan effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated withits past program to develop and produce chemical weapons.

For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq (ph)state establishment. Tariq (ph) includes facilities designedspecifically for Iraq's chemical weapons program and employs keyfigures from past programs.

That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons business.What about the delivery end?

I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex calledal-Moussaid (ph), a site that Iraq has used for at least three yearsto transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to thefield.

In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity inthis picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at thistransshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by adecontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weaponsactivity.

What makes this picture significant is that we have ahuman source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weaponsoccurred at this site at that time. So it's not just the photo, andit's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo and then theknowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case.

This photograph of the site taken two months later in July showsnot only the previous site, which is the figure in the middle at thetop with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site,as well as all of the other sites around the site, have been fullybulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqisliterally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of thissite in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be therefrom years of chemical weapons activity.

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