New Documents Show Firestone Had Evidence of Problem Early On

W A S H I N G T O N, Sept. 8, 2000 -- Firestone was warned repeatedly about problems with tire tread separation that were killing drivers and passengers in Ford Explorers months before the tiremaker began recalling the defective tires, according to documents examined by ABCNEWS.

One graphic e-mail sent in June 1999 from an automotive center executive in the Middle East to a Ford customer service manager blames the death of three children, ages 12, 11 and 10, in a car accident involving a defective Firestone tire.

“It is very pathetic that our Explorer customers are losing lives because of the tyres,” the executive wrote the Ford official.

The documents, hundreds of pages of correspondence and memos obtained by ABCNEWS, appear to be yet more damaging evidence that the Nashville-based tiremaker had evidence of the tire problem long before they took action this summer. At least 88 people have died in the United States and 34 in Venezuela in accidents attributed to faulty Firestone tires, mostly on Ford Explorers. Firestone announced a voluntary recall of 6.5 million ATX, ATX II and Wilderness tires, most of which were on Ford Explorers, on Aug. 9.

Frustations with Firestone

Documents obtained by ABCNEWS earlier this week showed that Firestone —and Ford officials— knew of the tire problems as early as 1997, perhaps even earlier. The new documents show that car dealers and Ford officials appeared to make many frustrating attempts to get Firestone to address the problem of the tread-separating tires.

In addition, memos distributed during an annual Firestone sales and engineering meeting in February outlines claims data that shows that the number of claims on Wilderness AT tires grew 194 percent in a year, from 301 in 1998, to 885 last year.

A Ford spokesman said today that the documents substantiate the company’s position all along — that is was trying to get Firestone to take action. Ford has agreed to share the cost of the recall, which now is estimated to have cost Firestone $351 million.

The Whole Story?

In January 1999, one Ford manager in the Middle East wrote to another manager about his concerns that Firestone was not being entirely forthcoming to try to protect itself from an expensive recall or multiple lawsuits.

“If this was a single case, I would accept Firestone’s response … as they are the experts in the tire business, case closed,” the Ford manager wrote. “However, we now have three cases and is it possible that Firestone is not telling us the whole story to protect them from the recall or [a lawsuit]. I feel it is possible.”

The manager suggested that Ford should conduct its own investigation and make “our own analysis of the tires.”

Six months later, on June 23, the Middle East automotive center faxed a letter to a Ford customer service manager detailing the tragic accident that killed the three children. Their mother, who was pregnant, apparently lost her unborn child but survived the crash, according to the letter.

The automotive center executive notes that “despite many discussions and inspections” of the defective tires, no action had been taken by Ford or Firestone to resolve the problem.

Two months later, in August, Ford began its program to voluntarily recall the defective tires in the Middle East.

But the correspondence over the issue continued.

On Sept. 12, 1999, the national service director of a Ford dealership in Dubai in theUnited Arab Emirates, wrote to a Ford Motor Co. manager in the customer service division in Dubai, expressing his fear about what will happen if the situation is not addressed.

“David, I am afraid that I can see a pattern emerging this tyre in this second case is totally destroyed,” wrote John Garthwaite from the Ford dealership. “ But it is clear to me the body damage is indicative of read separation. I am of the opinion that we need another immediate Firestone-type in-depth investigation and seek assurances before we have more serious consequences.”